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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
 
Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines") provides for increased or 
enhanced sentences for career offenders. 1 Conviction of 
certain prior crimes (e.g., "contr olled substance offenses") 
triggers the application of career offender status. This 
appeal by Abdul Aziz Shabazz raises the question of 
whether a prior state conviction for employing a juvenile in 
a drug distribution ring is properly consider ed a controlled 
substance offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. We 
conclude that it is and thus affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
Jurisdiction properly existed in the District Court 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. Jurisdiction in this Court is 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C.S 3742(a). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. All citations are to the 1998 United States Sentencing Guidelines, the 
Guidelines in effect at the time of Shabazz's sentencing. U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.1 reads in part: 
 
       A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least 
       eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant 
       offense of conviction, (2) the instant of fense of conviction is a 
felony 
       that is either a crime of violence or a contr olled substance 
offense, 
       and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of 
       either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 
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Shabazz's notice of appeal was timely filed. W e exercise 
plenary review over a District Court's deter mination that an 
offense constituted a controlled substance offense for 
purposes of determining career of fender status under 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. See United States v. W illiams, 176 F.3d 
714, 715 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
I. 
 
On November 12, 1998, Shabazz pled guilty to conspiring 
to possess heroin with the intent to distribute in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. SS 846, 841(a)(1), and to possessing a 
counterfeit security with intent to deceive in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 513(a). In anticipation of sentencing, a probation 
officer prepared a presentence r eport. He determined that 
Shabazz should be classified as a career of fender pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. In making that finding, the probation 
officer determined that (1) Shabazz was at least 18 years 
old at the time of the offense, (2) the of fense was a 
controlled substance offense under the Guidelines, and (3) 
he had two prior felony convictions that are classified as a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance of fense. See 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. 
 
The probation officer determined that Shabazz had three 
predicate convictions that supported the thir d prong of 
S 4B1.1. Those prior felony convictions included (1) a 1988 
New Jersey conviction for possession of a contr olled 
substance with intent to distribute, (2) a 1989 New Jersey 
conviction for employing a juvenile in a drug distribution 
scheme, and (3) a 1982 New York conviction for second 
degree robbery. 
 
At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the use of the 
latter two convictions to satisfy the third pr ong of S 4B1.1. 
Specifically, counsel argued that (1) the crime of 
employment of a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme is 
akin to a solicitation conviction and thus not a controlled 
substance offense as defined in the Guidelines, and (2) the 
robbery conviction was not supported by adequate proof. 
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Over these objections, the District Court classified Shabazz 
as a career offender predicated on the first two listed felonies.2 
 
As a career offender, Shabazz's adjusted offense level was 
29 and his criminal history category remained unchanged 
at VI. This places his potential sentence within the range of 
151-188 months. However, the District Court departed 
downward pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 3 and sentenced 
Shabazz to two concurrent prison terms of 72 months. 
 
II. 
 
The parties do not dispute that the first two pr ongs of 
S 4B1.1 have been satisfied. The sole question for decision 
is whether Shabazz's state conviction for employing a minor 
in the distribution of a controlled substance is properly 
classified as a predicate controlled substance offense 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. 
 
       The term "controlled substance of fense" means an 
       offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
       imprisonment for a term exceeding one year , that 
       prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, 
       or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a 
       counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled 
       substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to 
       manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(b). 
 
In order to classify a prior conviction as a controlled 
substance offense, the sentencing court should begin with 
the language of the statute. If the statute of conviction is 
clear, the court should not look beyond that statute's text. 
See United States v. Hernandez, 218 F .3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court noted however, that"if I were required to make a 
finding, I believe there's a sufficient basis for this Court to conclude 
that 
Mr. Shabazz . . . was convicted of second degree robbery." 
 
3. Section 5K1.1, entitled "Substantial Assistance to Authorities," 
provides: "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart 
from the guidelines." 
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2000). However, if the statute of conviction is unclear or 
broad enough to criminalize acts that ar e not properly 
classified as a controlled substance of fense, the sentencing 
court may look beyond the bare elements of the statute. 
See id.; Williams, 176 F.3d at 716 n.3; see also United 
States v. Casarez-Bravo, 181 F.3d 1074, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 
1999) (allowing a court to look past the statutory definition 
of a crime and to examine judicially noticeable facts or 
documents that clearly establish the conviction to be a 
predicate conviction for enhancement purposes); United 
States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1998) ("In 
those narrow circumstances in which [a defendant] could 
have been [convicted] in two ways, . . . a district court must 
look past the fact of conviction and the elements of the 
offense to determine which type of of fense supported the 
defendant's conviction."); United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 
52, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If . . . the statute reaches both 
conduct that satisfies these definitions and conduct that 
does not, then the charging instrument and jury 
instructions may be consulted to determine whether the 
prior conviction was imposed for conduct that qualifies for 
enhancement purposes."). 
 
Significantly, in United States v. Her nandez, 145 F.3d 
1433 (11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh Cir cuit decided an 
issue similar to the one this Court is asked to decide today. 
In that case, a jury found the defendant, Modesto 
Hernandez, guilty of, among other things, possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute. In the pr esentencing 
report, the probation officer applied the career offender 
provision of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 as a r esult of two prior 
controlled substance convictions. Hernandez challenged the 
use of the convictions as outside the scope of a controlled 
substance offense for S 4B1.1 purposes. 
 
The statute that Hernandez was convicted under stated 
that " `it is unlawful for any person to sell, purchase, 
manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to sell a 
controlled substance.' " See id. at 1440 (quoting Fla. Stat. 
Ann. S 893.13(1)(a) (1993)). Hernandez's 1993 plea of nolo 
contendere to both charges did not specify whether his 
convictions were for the purchase or the sale of controlled 
substances. The difference was significant because a 
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conviction for purchasing did not qualify as a controlled 
substance offense for S 4B1.1 enhancement purposes, while 
a conviction for sale did. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit held that although the District 
Judge improperly considered the arr est affidavits in 
determining whether the convictions wer e for purchasing or 
selling, a sentencing court could look beyond the words of 
the statute to determine if an offense qualifies as a 
predicate for S 4B1.1 enhancement purposes. On remand, it 
instructed the District Court to examine "easily produced 
and evaluated court documents, such as any helpful plea 
agreements or plea transcripts, any presentencing reports 
adopted by the sentencing judges, and any findings made 
by the sentencing judges," in order to deter mine whether 
the prior convictions qualified as predicate offenses for 
enhancement under S 4B1.1. Id. 
 
When considering the classification of a criminal statute 
as a controlled substance offense, the sentencing court 
should ascertain if the conduct that causes a conviction 
under the statute was a controlled substance of fense. See 
Williams, 176 F.3d at 717. Put another way, the sentencing 
court should ask if a violation of the criminal statute 
facilitated "the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or 
dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or 
a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, 
import, export, distribute, or dispense." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(b). 
For example, in Williams this Court considered whether a 
conviction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 843(b) for" `knowingly or 
intentionally' " using " `any communication facility in 
committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of 
any acts constituting a [drug-related] felony' " was properly 
classified as a controlled substance of fense. Williams, 176 
F.3d at 716 (quoting 21 U.S.C. S 843(b)). This Court ruled 
that "where a particular S 843(b) conviction established that 
the defendant `committ[ed],' `caus[ed],' or `facilitat[ed]' one 
of the acts enumerated in U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(2), that 
conviction qualifies as a `controlled substance offense' for 
purposes of determining career of fender status." Id. at 717 
(alteration in original). 
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The disputed statute of conviction in this case is entitled 
"Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme." The 
operative statutory language reads: "Any person being at 
least 18 years of age who knowingly uses, solicits, directs, 
hires or employs a person 17 years of age or younger to 
violate N.J.S. 2C:35-4 or subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5, is 
guilty of a crime of the second degree . . . ." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2C:35-6 (West 1995).4 The parties do not dispute that 
Shabazz's conviction under S 2C:35-6 was for conduct that 
facilitated the distribution of a controlled substance. 
 
However, Shabazz urges us not to conclude our analysis 
here. He contends that, although the of fense underlying 
S 2C:35-6 may be a controlled substance offense, the 
criminal act committed by him was solicitation and 
solicitation cannot be considered a contr olled substance 
offense. Shabazz points out that in United States v. Dolt, 27 
F.3d 235 (11th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that solicitation was 
not among the preliminary and inchoate crimes listed 
separately in the Application Notes to the Guidelines as 
constituting a controlled substance offense. See id. at 238. 
However, the Court continued to explor e the treatment of 
solicitation as applied in Florida courts to deter mine 
whether it was sufficiently similar to those crimes listed as 
controlled substance offenses. See id. Since solicitation is 
distinct and generally further removed fr om the facilitated 
act, the Court reasoned that it was sufficiently dissimilar to 
the preliminary and inchoate crimes listed in the 
Guidelines and thus not covered. See id.  at 238-40. 
 
If we were to decide that Dolt contr olled this case, we 
would be required to determine if Shabazz's conduct 
constituted solicitation or one of the other enumerated 
offenses in S 2C:35-6. New Jersey criminal law no longer 
provides for the separate offense of solicitation. Instead, 
solicitation is punishable as a criminal attempt in violation 
of N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:5-1. See State v. Sunzar, 751 A.2d 
627, 631 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999); State v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The cited statutes within S 2C:35-6 r espectively refer to the illegal 
maintenance or operation of a production facility for a controlled 
dangerous substance and distribution of a contr olled substance. 
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Jovanovic, 416 A.2d 961, 965 (N.J. Super . Ct. 1980). Based 
on the Model Penal Code as its conceptual sour ce, see 
Jovanovic, 416 A.2d at 631, New Jersey defines solicitation 
as " `no more than asking or enticing someone to commit a 
crime.' " Sunzar, 751 A.2d at 630 (quoting State v. Gay, 486 
P.2d 341, 345 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)). 
 
In Williams, this Court refused to apply Dolt to 
convictions under S 843(b), and left open as well the 
question of whether solicitation convictions may be 
considered a controlled substance of fense. See Williams, 
176 F.3d at 717 n.4. We need not r each that issue in this 
case. The New Jersey statute of conviction her e criminalizes 
five different acts (i.e., using, soliciting, directing, hiring or 
employing) related to exploiting a juvenile in a drug 
distribution scheme. Even if we were to find that mere 
solicitation of a juvenile does not qualify as a controlled 
substance offense, some of the other criminalized acts in 
the New Jersey statute clearly do qualify, such as the use, 
employment or direction of a juvenile. Because the record 
is unclear for which act Shabazz was formerly charged and 
the statute criminalizes different acts that may or may not 
be controlled substance offenses, we look past the words of 
the statute to the "conduct of which the defendant was 
convicted." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 app. n.2. 
 
Evidence of the conduct underlying Shabazz's violation of 
N.J.S. S 2C:35-6 is provided in the pr esentence report and 
the state court's opinion denying post conviction r elease. 
According to the presentence report, Newark police officers 
were conducting surveillance and observed Shabazz and 
two others conducting drug sales.5 One of the two other 
dealers was a juvenile. The New Jersey court r ecounted the 
facts as follows: "[D]efendant acknowledged that he `used 
S.G.,' a 17-year old juvenile, `as a lookout' while preparing 
to sell a large quantity of cocaine." State v. Shabazz, 622 
A.2d 914, 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). This 
sufficiently demonstrates that Shabazz was caught past the 
point of solicitation and was actually using others, 
including a juvenile, to facilitate the distribution of a drug. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is important to note that Shabazz did not object to the probation 
officer's description of his underlying conduct. 
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Thus his conduct would be sufficient to qualify as a 
controlled substance offense. 
 
* * * 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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